Much contemporary nanotoxicology, nanotherapeutic and nanoregulatory research has been characterised by a focus on investigating how delivery of engineered nanoparticles (ENPs) to cells is dictated primarily by components of the ENP surface. An alternative model, some implications of which are discussed here, begins with fundamental physicochemical research into the interaction of a dynamic nanoparticle-protein corona (NPC) with biological systems. The proposed new model also requires, however, that any such fresh NPC physicochemical research approach should involve integration and targeted collaboration from (...) the earliest stages with nanotoxicology, nanotherapeutics and nanoregulatory expertise. The justification for this integrated approach, we argue, relates not just to efficiency and promotion of innovation, but to an acknowledgement that public-funded basic physicochemical research in particular should now be accepted to incorporate strong higher order public goods elements from its inception, not merely after product development at the technology transfer stage. Issues, in other words, such as university research co-operation, commercialization and intellectual property (IP) protection, safety and cost-effectiveness regulatory assessment, as well as technology transfer should not be viewed as second tier considerations even in a ‘blue sky’ NPC basic research agenda. (shrink)

In the past few years, a large number of new chemokines (chemotactic cytokines) and chemokine receptors have been discovered. The growth in knowledge about these molecules has been achieved largely through advances in bioinformatics and the expansion of expression sequence tag (EST) databases. It is now clear that chemokines are crucial in controlling both the development and functioning of leukocytes and that their role is not restricted to cell attraction, as originally assumed. In particular, recent findings provide strong support for (...) the idea that chemokines and their receptors are especially important in the control of viral infection and replication. Thus, specific chemokines are now known to enhance the cytotoxic activity of infected cells, thus inhibiting further virus replication. In addition, some chemokines orchestrate the recruitment of activated leukocytes to foci of infection to aid viral clearance. Viruses, in turn, have evolved various defences against chemokines. These range from the production of proteins that inhibit biological activity of the host chemokine to the hijacking of the chemokine system, whereby certain viruses utilize chemokine receptors for their entry. The latter viral defence can itself be blocked by chemokines. Altogether, these findings illustrate the central role of chemokines in many different phases of the immune response, particularly those aspects involving antiviral defence, a variety and versatility that was not fully appreciated even a few years ago. BioEssays 23:428–435, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

It is shown that, if a, b are recursively enumerable degrees such that 0

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Der Skeptizismus ist der advocatus diaboli der Philosophie. Welche Immunisierungsstrategien fand man gegen ihn? Zu den spannenden und lehrreichen Facetten des Deutschen Idealismus gehört zweifelsohne die mit der Auseinandersetzung mit Kants kritizistischer Position anhebende Debatte um einen neuen Skeptizismus. Von ausserordentlichem Interesse bleibt hierbei der Gehalt der Repliken Reinholds, Fichtes und Hegels auf die Attacken von Gottlob Ernst Schulze. Aus heutiger Perspektive geht es um die philosophische Relevanz und Stringenz der verschiedenen Immunisierungsstrategien gegen den Skeptizismus. Der Band widmet sich den (...) philosophischen Voraussetzungen, systematischen Aspekten und Kontexten der Angriffe Schulzes auf Reinhold, sowie den Auswirkungen dieser zum Teil neu zugespitzten Angriffe bei Fichte, Hegel u.a. (shrink)

La menzogna è irrinunciabile per vincere in politica? Davi ci spiega quali sono i meccanismi di persuasione a cui ricorrono taluni politici per farsi eleggere e quali le responsabilità di quegli elettori che scelgono comunque di votare chi sostiene anche ciò che non può essere vero. È indubbio che la comunicazione politica si rifaccia al simbolismo e al linguaggio delle favole; non necessariamente per occultare la realtà, ma più direttamente per esprimere con maggiore efficacia il suo messaggio. Alle celebri favole (...) di 'Biancaneve', 'Cenerentola', 'Il brutto anatroccolo' sono ricorsi infatti uomini politici del calibro di Berlusconi, Prodi, Nixon, Carter, Mitterrand e partiti quali la Democrazia Cristiana; l'hanno fatto per conquistare voti ma anche per attivare ampi meccanismi di consenso che attingessero direttamente dall'inconscio collettivo. Le conseguenze - ammonisce l'autore - possono essere molto serie, come nel caso dell'attuale politica americana che ha portato la manipolazione e l'inganno a essere riconosciuti come tratti identitari della presidenza di George W. Bush. (shrink)

I show that in his De motu animalium Aristoteles proposes a teleology of the practical on the most general zoological level, i.e. on the level common to humans and self-moving animals. A teleology of the practical is a teleological account of the highest practical goals of animal and human self-motion. I argue that Aristotle conceives of such highest practical goals as goals that are contingently related to their realizations. Animal and human self-motion is the kind of action in which certain (...) state of affairs that realize values are mechanized. (shrink)

This paper discusses Aristotle's notion of the practical syllogism. It is argued that the notion of ‘practical’ reasoning in the sense of reasoning which implies motion in one sense or the other is alien to Aristotle's philosophy of nature. All (at least in type) the relevant passages will be discussed. The outcome is that there are three different contexts in which it would be justified to speak of practical syllogisms: (i) human deliberation, (ii) the illustration of the triggering cause of (...) animal motion, and (iii) the teleological ex post explanationof human action. (i) is genuine, but non-deductive reasoning which does not immediately result in action/motion, whereas (ii) is not genuine reasoning, but an analogy with deductive reasoning. Finally, the relation between (i) and (ii) in Aristotle's theory of animal motion will be discussed. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to explain Aristotle’s definition of the vegetative part of the soul in the De anima from a methodological point of view. I discuss Aristotle’s conception of the soul and his conception of “parts of the soul” before I turn to his definition of the vegetative part of the soul in De anima II 4. I argue that the definition of the vegetative capacity is deliberately abstract so as to cover its various activities under one (...) common heading. I also argue that the De anima deliberately avoids a positive and determinate description of the activity of the soul that is properly responsible for the vegetative functions, and that Aristotle offers such a positive and determinate description in his works dedicated to the actions and affections “common to body and soul”. (shrink)

Describes the classicall law theory basics. Translaltion from German.

Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I (...) will discuss two possible problems for the non-two-jobs view. (shrink)

In this paper which consists of two parts (Teil I and Teil II) we champion Diophantus of Alexandria and Isabella BaÅ¡makova against Norbert Schappacher. In two publications ([Schappacher 1998a] and [Schappacher 1998b]) he puts forward inter alia two propositions: Questioning Diophantus’ originality he considers affirmatively the possibility that the Arithmetica are the joint work of a team of authors like Bourbaki. And he calls BaÅ¡makova’s claim (in [BaÅ¡makova 1972]) that Diophantus uses negative numbers, a nonsense , reproaching her for her (...) thoughtlessness . Teil I: First, we disprove Schappacher’s Bourbaki thesis. Second, we investigate the semantic meaning and historical significance of Diophantus’ keywords $ λvarepsilon tildeιψιζ and ὕπαρξιζ. Next, we discuss Schappacher’s epistemology of the history of mathematics and defend BaÅ¡makova’s methods. Finally we analyse in detail three problems from Diophantus’ Arithmetica (and their solutions) given by Thomas Heath and Helmuth Gericke as proof of the their claim that Diophantus did not use negative numbers. Teil II: In this Part, we give 33 places where Diophantus uses negative quantities as intermediate results; they appear as differences a − b of positive rational numbers, the subtrahend b being bigger than the minuend a; they each represent the (negative) basis ( πλvarepsilonυρacuteα ) of a square number ( τvarepsilonτρacuteαγω ν o ζ ), which is afterwards computed by the formula (a - b) 2 = a 2 + b 2 - 2ab $ . Finally, we report how the topic Diophantus and the negative numbers has been dealt with by translators and commentators from Maximus Planudes onwards. Und er kommt zu dem Ergebnis: ≪Nur ein Traum war das Erlebnis. Weil≫, so schlieβt er messerscharf, ≪nicht sein k a n n, was nicht sein d a r f.≫ CHRISTIAN MORGENSTERN: Palmstrm. (shrink)

"Die Bildung muss auf die volle Entfaltung der menschlichen Persönlichkeit und auf die Stärkung der Achtung vor den Menschenrechten und Grundfreiheiten gerichtet sein.

Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I (...) will discuss two possible problems for the non-two-jobs view. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Experience or Interpretation:"What You See Is Not What You Read"Klaus OttmannMuseums of modern and contemporary art are growing at an unprecedented rate. New museums are being founded and existing ones are expanding exhibition spaces and acquiring more and more works of art. Concurrently, cultural institutions compete with a growing number of art fairs, biennials, galleries, and public collection spaces.Since the 1980s the focus of museums increasingly has been (...) on education and interpretation, which among other things has created a boom for audio guides and scholarly exhibition catalogs at the expense of the unmediated experience of works of art. Perhaps what is needed are exhibitions that present art again primarily as "experience," with minimal curatorial and didactic intervention. [End Page 13]I have borrowed the title of my essay from a lecture that was given by Nicolas Serota, the director of the Tate galleries in London, in 1996. His lecture was subtitled "The Dilemma of Museums of Modern Art."But the question of the presentation of art, and specifically, that of experience vs. interpretation, by no means originated in the last decades. It is at least as old a question as modern art itself, going as far back as the nineteenth-century French intellectual dispute on the museum between the poet Paul Valéry and the novelist Marcel Proust, as recounted with a sympathetic voice by the German philosopher and cultural critic Theodor Adorno in a short essay with the minimalist title "Valéry Proust Museum."There is much to be learned from reading this small text. Paul Valéry criticized the museum of his time (the Louvre) for creating confusion in the mind of the spectator by reducing the experience to the level of information only. No one would want to listen to ten orchestras at once, he argued, yet we are forced to apprehend, at the same moment, a seascape, a portrait, and a still-life, or worse, painting styles completely incompatible with each other. He warned that excess of information would lead to impoverishment of the senses, as art was becoming a matter of education. Valéry's view could be regarded as the conservative position.Marcel Proust's view was more modernist: he regarded the museum as the best place to view art. Devoid of décor and other commonplace distractions, its galleries symbolized for him the inner spaces into which the artist withdraws to create works of art.Both Valéry and Proust emphasized that art should be enjoyed. But while for Valéry art lost its vitality in the museum and effectively "died," Proust saw an afterlife of art in the museum and in the subjective stream of consciousness of the viewer.For Adorno, both views were too one-sided and extreme. Valéry's absolute unwavering contemplation of pure art takes the risk of neutralization, unless the work can point beyond itself toward a social context. Thus, a work of art is neither an embodiment of a Platonic idea, as Valéry believed, nor is it exclusively a reflection of the soul, as Proust understood it. Rather, in Adorno's view, art is a "force field" between the art and the viewer, both passive and active.In his 1931 lectures on "Art as Experience," the American philosopher John Dewey said:The trouble with existing theories [of art] is that they start from ready-made compartmentalization, or from a conception of art that "spiritualizes" it out of connection with the objects of concrete experience. The alternative, however, to such spiritualization is not a degrading... materialization of works of fine art, but a conception that discloses the way in which these works idealize qualities found in common experience.1 [End Page 14]In my book The Genius Decision: The Extraordinary and the Postmodern Condition, I describe the creative act as an active-passive leap that the artist is impelled to make and the viewer is challenged to repeat.Wittgenstein often spoke about the inexpressible, that which is beyond the limits of language. He called it "running against the boundaries of language." It is something any poet, musician, or painter is familiar with; they all run against boundaries of language, sound, or color... (shrink)

This chapter first argues against the widely accepted “mentalist” interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the perception of external objects. On that view, the perception of objects results from an act of synthesis of the diverse perceptual input provided by the different sense modalities. I argue that Aristotle’s conception of perception does not require such mental “construction” of external objects. For him, we unfailingly perceive external objects by way of modally specific perception: perception without qualification is primarily of external 3-D objects, (...) while modally specific perception is of perceptual qualities. As the special senses cannot operate in isolation from the perceptual system as a whole, it follows that we see colors, hear sounds, etc., and thereby perceive the objects whose colors and sounds they are. The second part offers a causal interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of perception as “reception of the form without the matter,” according to which the causal history of sensory affection fixes the content of the resulting act of perception: perception is cognitive in virtue of being the matterless presence of external things’ qualities in the perceiver. (shrink)

Cases of acts of solidarity can be divided into at least two groups. Solidarity in a narrow sense of the term refers to what I label project-related solidarity; it is prevalent in the modern world at least as much as it was found in past worlds. In contrast, the philosophical discussions of "solidarity" refer to the altruism and mutuality typically found in close human relationships. This concept of "solidarity" is theoretically unfruitful and even misleading. I propose to abandon the term (...) "solidarity" in order to regain sight of the individual phenomena. When these are taken into consideration, a return to the community is no longer called for. I rather argue that modern societies are perfectly capable of inspiring feelings of loyalty and civic virtues, though not by resorting to the old sources of "solidarity". Modern forms such as free associations, participation and, not least, the existence of a liberal society itself are sufficient. Public discussions of solidarity are additionally distorted by frequent appeals to a normative sense of the term. The argument put forward in this collectivist context that an obligation of solidarity results from gratefulness to the community is not found to be convincing. Individuals are not obliged to be grateful to a nation in a way that would be normatively binding. (shrink)

In what follows, I will concentrate on the type of temporality which structures Wittgenstein's method of a perspicuous representation, or of a synoptic overview (übersichtliche Darstellung). I will argue that the temporal order which applies to (giving) a perspicuous representation is best to be described as retroactivity, deferred action or afterwardness (Nachträglichkeit), a concept which calls into question the ordinary conception of time as a linear and irreversible process as well as of a clear break between present and past. First, (...) I will turn to Sigmund Freud and the way he developed the concept of Nachträglichkeit or retroactivity in some of his case-studies. The basic idea here is that the meaning or content of a past experience is constituted by repeating it in a different or disguised way. I will then argue that the relation between a perspicuous representation and what is made perspicuous is best interpreted as a relation of Nachträglichkeit. This interpretation also accounts for the involvement of the subject in the object made perspicuous—as it is stressed by Wittgenstein and illustrated by his discursive method. (shrink)

Trust features prominently in a number of policy documents that have been issued in recent years to facilitate data sharing and international collaboration in medical research. However, it often remains unclear what is meant by ‘trust’. By exploring a concrete international collaboration between Denmark and Pakistan, we develop a way of unpacking trust that shifts focus from what trust ‘is’ to what people invest in relationships and what references to trust do for them in these relationships. Based on interviews in (...) both Pakistan and Denmark with people who provide blood samples and health data for the same laboratory, we find that when participants discuss trust they are trying to shape their relationship to researchers while simultaneously communicating important hopes, fears and expectations. The types of trust people talk about are never unconditional, but involve awareness of uncertainties and risks. There are different things at stake for people in different contexts, and therefore it is not the same to trust researchers in Pakistan as it is in Denmark, even when participants donate to the same laboratory. We conclude that casual references to ‘trust’ in policy documents risk glossing over important local differences and contribute to a de-politicization of basic inequalities in access to healthcare. (shrink)

Dem Rezensenten obliegt die traurige Pflicht, das letzte Buch des vor kurzem (am 18. August 2003) verstorbenen Berliner Emeritus für Byzantinistik, Paul Speck, zu besprechen. Wie die große Menge seiner früheren Artikel und Monographien beschäftigt sich auch dieses Buch in z.T. polemischer Auseinandersetzung mit den Positionen anderer Forscher mit den Quellen zur byzantinischen Geschichte des 7.–9. Jahrhunderts, also mit der Zeit der sog. Dunklen Jahrhunderte, vor allem mit der Periode des sog. Bilderstreites. Es handelt sich, wie Speck selbst in der (...) Einleitung darlegt (S. 24), bei der vorliegenden Monographie nicht um eine Biographie Kaiser Leons III. (717–741), sondern um eine Analyse der Berichte über die ersten Regierungsjahre dieses Herrschers in drei wichtigen griechischen und lateinischen Quellentexten, nämlich in der Historia syntomos des Patriarchen Nikephoros I. von Konstantinopel (806–815), in der Chronographia des Theophanes (von Speck zu Recht überwiegend als Werk des Georgios synkellos angesehen) und im römischen liber pontificalis. Letzterer spielt allerdings im hier besprochenen Teil 1 nur im XV. Abschnitt (S. 303) eine Rolle. Grundsätzlich gilt nach Speck, daß fast alles, was in der Historia syntomos des Nikephoros berichtet wird, sich meist sogar in derselben Reihenfolge auch in der Chronographia des „Theophanes“ wiederfindet, daß letztere aber zahlreiche zusätzliche Informationen enthält, so daß die Existenz einer beiden gemeinsame Quelle oder Vorlage sehr wahrscheinlich ist (S. 55–56). Bereits in seinen früheren Arbeiten entwickelte er dazu die Hypothese, zwei Materialsammlungen des Georgios synkellos (das sog. vielleicht noch in Palästina verfaßte erste und das dieses bis 815 fortsetzende, in Konstantinopel zusammengestellte zweite Dossier) hätten sowohl für die Historia syntomos des Patriarchen Nikephoros (1. Dossier) als auch für die Chronographia des „Theophanes“ (2. Dossier), aber auch für die christlich-orientalischen Chroniken (diese sind nach Speck vom 1. Dossier abhängig) die Masse der Informationen geliefert (zusammenfassend S. 19–23, ferner S. 95 und S. 375–376). (shrink)

In this article, I try to show that the question of what the “first proposition” in Groundwork I is can be answered by textual evidence. At the end of paragraph 15 of GMS I, Kant recapitulates the “first proposition”. It is: “Eine Handlung aus Pflicht sondert den Einfluss der Neigung ganz ab.“ (“An action from duty puts aside entirely the influence of inclination.”). It is also shown that this “proposition” summarizes an important result of Kant’s argument in the preceding paragraphs (...) 8–13 and is presupposed by the “second proposition” and by Kant’s whole argument in the paragraphs 14 and 15, which he recapitulates in the last sentence of paragraph 15. (shrink)

Here I try a new synthesis of personalism and materialism leading to new concepts of sense. Beginnig with the analysis of the correlations between matter, personality, language, understanding, cognition, knowledge, and the problem of truth, followed by a critique of pragmatism, personalism and "new realism" as well as by ontological concretisations in different fields of philosophy, i.e. in logical order from cosmology to anthropology, ethics, history and political philosophy (including globalization, digital revolution amd ecocide), aesthetics, and philosophy of religion, leading (...) to new concepts of sense and value. Of immediate political relevance is my new concept of a democratic eco-socialism, drawing conclusions of the failure of the socialist experiences in the world up to nowadays. Not giving up the Marxian vision of a realm of Freedom, Justice and Solidarity, that of a "free association of free individuals". (shrink)

The present article provides a mereological analysis of Euclid’s planar geometry as presented in the first two books of his Elements. As a standard of comparison, a brief survey of the basic concepts of planar geometry formulated in a set-theoretic framework is given in Section 2. Section 3.2, then, develops the theories of incidence and order using a blend of mereology and convex geometry. Section 3.3 explains Euclid’s “megethology”, i.e., his theory of magnitudes. In Euclid’s system of geometry, megethology takes (...) over the role played by the theory of congruence in modern accounts of geometry. Mereology and megethology are connected by Euclid’s Axiom 5: “The whole is greater than the part.” Section 4 compares Euclid’s theory of polygonal area, based on his “Whole-Greater-Than-Part” principle, to the account provided by Hilbert in his Grundlagen der Geometrie. An hypothesis is set forth why modern treatments of geometry abandon Euclid’s Axiom 5. Finally, in Section 5, the adequacy of atomistic mereology as a framework for a formal reconstruction of Euclid’s system of geometry is discussed. (shrink)

Suvremenu kognitivnu znanost ne možemo razumjeti bez najnovijeg razvoja računalne znanosti, umjetne inteligencije , robotike, neuroznanosti, biologije, lingvistike i psihologije. Kako klasična analitička filozofija, tako i tradicionalna AI pretpostavile su da sve vrste znanja moramo prikazati formalnim ili programskim jezicima. Ova je pretpostavka u proturječju s nedavnim uvidima u biologiju evolucije i razvojnu psihologiju ljudskog organizma. Većina je našega znanja implicitna i nesvjesna. To nije formalno prikazano, nego utjelovljeno znanje koje učimo radeći, a razumijevamo tjelesnim suodnosom s ekološkim nišama i (...) društvenim okolišima. To vrijedi ne samo za vještine na niskoj razini nego i za visokorazinska područja kategorizacije, jezika i apstraktnog mišljenja. Utjelovljena kognitivna znanost, AI, kao i robotika pokušavaju umjetnom evolucijom stvoriti utjelovljeni um. S filozofskoga gledišta, zapanjuje da tradicionalni pojmovi kognitivne znanosti i AI s formalnim predodžbama znanja pripadaju tradicionalnoj liniji filozofije.Modern cognitive science cannot be understood without recent developments in computer science,Artificial Intelligence , robotics, neuroscience, biology, linguistics, and psychology. Classic analyticphilosophy as well as traditional AI assumed that all kinds of knowledge must explicitly be representedby formal or programming languages. This assumption is in contradiction to recent insightsinto the biology of evolution and developmental psychology of the human organism. Most ofour knowledge is implicit and unconscious. It is not formally represented, but embodied knowledgewhich is learnt by doing and understood by bodily interacting with ecological niches and social environments.That is true not only for low-level skills, but even for high-level domains of categorization,language, and abstract thinking. Embodied cognitive science, AI, and robotics try to build theembodied mind in an artificial evolution. From a philosophical point of view, it is amazing that thenew ideas of embodied mind and robotics have deep roots in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Throughout the Homo Sacer series, Giorgio Agamben takes seriously the political and philosophical significance of Christian ritual in his archaeology of Western political discourse. In Opus Dei, Agamben argues for the sacrifice of the Mass as the paradigm for the ontology of effectivity, an ontology he sees as still regnant in the West. This ontology depends on the discourse of duty or office, and it begins with the priestly office. The priest’s duty is to be an “animate instrument” in the (...) Mass. However, Agamben’s archaeology contains a massive gap between scholastic theology and Enlightenment political theory—the Protestant Reformation. I argue that Agamben’s hypothesis requires attending to the reformation of the Mass. Examining the works of Luther and Zwingli, I show that in spite of their rejection of the priesthood, the discourse of duty and operativity not only persists but expands through their respective sacramental theologies. (shrink)

The theory of resistance here elaborated is based on considerations current since the 18th century and concern the proof of reality of the external world. However, what is ignored in the course of these proofs are the social, psychological, and in particular the logical aspects of resistance. The idea of a theory of resistance is inspired by tendencies in the philosophy of technology, as well as other current philosophical and scientific lines of thought that obscure their metaphysical underpinnings, advocating a (...) position of complete achievability of human and natural relations. The theory of resistance seeks to show that resistance is a reflexive term that concerns relations, not objects or those relations that can be expressed in qualities and quantities. Furthermore, this concept has a positioning role, important in epistemological, as well as ethical and anthropological sense. Resistance is a central, although not the sole characteristic of reality. As an ethical category, it is articulated, for example, in the idea of dignity if understood as hostility to mere typologization and subjection to calcu?lation. The theory of resistance does not advocate some existing reality, but limits the domain of validity of constructivist and narrativist theories. (shrink)

In the paper I voice my dissatisfaction with the author's essay because I think that the proposed “McClellean shift” from skeptical to trusting theism faces serious problems. The troubles are mainly caused by the way in which McClellan suggests to extend and “amend” the theist’s argument via the Moorean shift (which is intended to be a counter-argument to the atheist’s evidential argument from evil). But McClellan's proposal is no amendment at all, as it robs the theist's Moore-inspired argument its entire (...) logico-probabilistic force. (shrink)

In his essay Tracy Lupher (henceforth, TL) is concerned with Robert Kane's (1984) version of the modal ontological argument (MOA). As he correctly points out, Kane's argument is valid only if the accessibility relation between possible worlds is assumed to be symmetric. TL's remarks pave the way to thinking that the MOA is intended to establish the existence of a perfect being as a matter of logical necessity. Moreover, given TL's undisputed supposition (even shared by Kane) that S5 - in (...) which the accessibility relation is symmetric - captures the notion of logical necessity, the real issue becomes whether the premise of the MOA is true. Contrary to TL's main claim, the discussion thus shifts back from technical arguments for why the appropriate modal logic must have a symmetric accessibility relation to metaphysical, theological, or conceptual considerations about the notion of a perfect being itself. I argue that it is only due to such considerations that we even start to ponder the question of what modal logic is the appropriate one to choose. (shrink)

In their (2008) article Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features C.S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan (henceforth, JN) argue that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage even though its object language is not semantically closed. I do not take issue with this claim. I find fault though with the following points contained in JN’s article: First, that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage, even though this metalanguage is not semantically closed. Second, that the (...) presented examples of Liar-like paradox are supposed to be counterexamples to Tarski’s diagnosis of the classic Liar paradox. Third, that JN fail to notice Tarski’s postulate. And finally, that JN fail to recognize that the world they are pondering is not among the possible worlds. (shrink)

Pitanje izgrađuje li Europa politički identitet ili ostaje zajednica drugog reda odredit će put europske integracije. Uvjet političkog identiteta je zasigurno europska javnost; na taj način su građani sposobni prihvatiti odluke europskog političkog sustava sudjelujući u relevantnim raspravama. Tri koncepta javnog će poslužit će pri razumijevanju europske javnosti kao međusobne povezanosti zajednice temeljene na mrežama. Nadopunjavanje »javne sfere« »javnim diskursom« odražava nastojanje nadilaženja nacionalnih ideja: ne govorimo o jednoj europskoj javnosti, nego je ona zamišljena kao mreža parcijalnih nacionalnih javnosti, koje (...) izviru iz događaja koje imaju određen značaj za Europu. Tako se europski identitet može stvoriti fokusiranjem političkih interesa građana na teme od zajedničkog značaja. (shrink)

Eusociality is the form of animal social organization with a reproductive division of labor, most prominently known from ants and bees. Here I ask the question why this enormously successful form of social organization is missing in the largest and most diverse group of vertebrates, the teleost fishes. I first briefly review the phylogenetic distribution and likely evolutionary origins of eusociality. Then, after an equally very brief review of the diverse life history strategies of teleosts, I conclude that it is (...) not the lack of evolutionary pre-adaptations which is keeping teleosts from becoming eusocial. Rather, I argue, that the absence of eusocial fish is caused by a number of differences between aquatic (chiefly marine) and terrestrial ecosystems: (1) Greater offspring dispersal in aquatic ecosystems reduces the role of kin-selection. (2) Lesser predictability of the environment at larger timescales in marine ecosystems disfavors eusociality. (3) A briefer impact of resource pulses in aquatic ecosystems will cause less evolutionary pressure towards cooperation, and eventually eusociality. Finally, I conclude by predicting that the most likely places to find eusocial fishes will be the deep-water regions of the ocean and the African rift lakes. (shrink)

“How would Jesus live your life, with your personality, with your talents, with your life experiences, within your life context, if he were you?” is a question posed by Dallas Willard in The Divine Conspiracy. How is it possible for Jesus Christ, Second Person of the Trinity, to know about living a really human life with all of its heartache and struggles? The article presents the biblical teaching for Jesus’ authentic human experience, that Jesus is our genuine example and is (...) the unique one who can show us the way into Kingdom living. After addressing concerns that have been raised about emphasizing the example of Jesus, the NT data affirming Jesus’ authentic human experience are presented, along with some potential objections. The main claim defended: Jesus lived normally within his own human power, relying predominantly on the divine resources of the Father and the Holy Spirit, while using his own divine power infrequently. The article concludes with a few implications for practice, living within our personal human condition as Jesus did, and living beyond our human limitations as Jesus did. (shrink)

I propose that a dishonest signaling system can be evolutionarily stable in eusocial animal societies if the amount of dishonesty is balanced by the chance of non-reproductive workers to advance to the reproductive caste in the future. I express this trade-off in a modified form of Hamilton’s rule, where I distinguish between the real and perceived cost of an altruistic act, and between the real and perceived genetic relatedness between colony members. Furthermore, I elaborate how the vertebrate neuromodulator oxytocin could (...) serve as an internal representation of the perceived cost of an altruistic act and of perceived relatedness. Behavioral and receptor localization data support this hypothesis. The encoding of cost and relatedness by oxytocin is likely integrated with a number of other functions related to social bonding. I conclude with a discussion of honesty in signaling, an outline of testable consequences of this hypothesis, and a comparison between vertebrate and insect eusociality. (shrink)

We study computability of the abstract linear Cauchy problem equation image)where A is a linear operator, possibly unbounded, on a Banach space X. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for A such that the solution operator K: x ↦ u of the problem is computable. For studying computability we use the representation approach to computable analysis developed by Weihrauch and others. This approach is consistent with the model used by Pour-El/Richards.

*******Résume en français plus bas****** Karl Kraus’s favourable and conceptually complex comments of the portrait drawings byOskar Kokoschka in 1910 put us on the trail of a host of different phenomena of pictorial representation. Based on close-readings of several aphorisms by Kraus and drawings by Kokoschka, I suggest that there is something like realistic distortion and that the traditional concepts of style cannot account for all essential stylistic variations that are important in pictures. I argue that we need to introduce (...) the concept of subject specific style. This must be distinguished from other concepts such as signature style. I try to show how these conceptual distinctions are connected to the difference in representational range displayed by media that are based on traces, like photography, and by media based on testimony, like drawing or writing. *********** Résumé En 1910, Oskar Kokoschka produit une série de dessins pour la revue expressionniste berlinoise Der Sturm. L’un des portraits représente le satiriste Karl Kraus, un autre l’architecte Adolf Loos. Au même moment, Kraus fait paraître une série d’aphorismes qui commentent le travail de Kokoschka. Kraus part du travail de Kokoschka pour arriver à des principes généraux sur la représentation picturale. Une analyse des réflexions de l’écrivain et des deux dessins faits par Kokoschka nous permet non seulement de mieux comprendre comment un dessin peut saisir le caractère d’un modèle au-delà du physique, mais aussi de forger des concepts pour enrichir les notions de style traditionnelles. Nous soutenons dans notre article qu’il faut introduire l’idée d’un style à l’oeuvre pour compléter les notions de style habituelles.Le style à l’oeuvre peut être spécifique au sujet traité. Nous montrons en particulier comment le dessin permet des distorsions réalistes, difficiles à obtenir dans des médias basés sur la trace comme la photographie. (shrink)

Intentionality is a curious notion and so is partial identity; the latter is employed by Christopher Tomaszewski (henceforth, CT) in his paper to afford solutions to a wide array of different philosophical problems. The author’s central thesis is that intentionality is a kind of partial identity; i.e. when the mind is intentionally directed towards an external object, it "takes in" a part of the object – its form, but not its matter. In my essay I first expound Franz Brentano's views (...) on intentionality - inspired by Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism. Contrary to what CT suggests, I conclude (in light of Brentano's later work) that intentionality should not be characterized as a genuine relation since one can be intentionally directed towards existing as well as non-existing objects and since, in the case of the latter, it remains unclear what it is that the mind “takes in”. Second, I clarify the notion of partial identity. In this context it is not obvious to me what exactly CT's appeal to partial identity contributes to the solution of the problem of material constitution. Third, I explicate CT's thesis that intentionality is partial identity (based on previously given definitions) and conclude that his argument in support of mind/body-dualism fails. Overall, skepticism remains as to whether partial identity adequately captures the tricky terrain of intentionality. (shrink)